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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
One of the plaintiffs, W. Hughes Brockbank, 
isarnember of the Utah State Legislature. Mr. 
Brockbank and his wife, Fawn J. Brockbank, are 
partners doing business as Magic Chemical Company. 
The company submitted the low bid for the furnish-
ing of janitorial supplies to the State of Utah. 
I 
The bid was rejected by those authorities respon-
silile for the procurement of such supplies on the 
premise that defendant was subject to a conflict 
of interest. The rejection was made pursuant to 




~EMBERS OF THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE ARE 
PROHIBITED FROM BEING INTERESTED, IN A PRIVATE 
CAP!1CITY, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN 
CONTRACTS TO WHICH THE STATE OF UTAH IS A PARTY. 
The position of the defendants in this case 
I 
~s been enunciated in Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 
08-059, Aug. 28, 1968, a copy of which has been 
attached to plaintiffs' complaint. Challenge has 
been made by plaintiffs to the above-cited opinion 
of the Attorney General as it relates to members 
of the Utah State Legislature. The opinion was 
directed at all positions of employment by the 
State of Utah. The present discussion will be 
li1t1ited to those principles to which a member of 
ihe Utah State Legislature is subject. 
2 
The plaintiffs have asserted that the pro-
nibitions against public officers being interested 
;1n contracts to which the governmental entity they 
se1ve is a party are inapplicable to members of 
~c Utah State Legislature. The defendants con-
tend that members of the Utah State Legislature 
may not be interested in contracts to which the 
1
State of Utah is a party. (Contrary to the ini-
tial reaction of the plaintiffs, it has never been 
argued that legislators are precluded from dealing 
with political subdivisions of the State. The 
conclusion was that the prohibition applies only 
~those situations where the contract involves 
the State of Utah) • 
Basically, the defendants are of the opinion 
tnctt section 8, article XIII of the Utah Consti -
t11tion prohibits legislators from being interested, 
3 
either directly or indirectly, in contracts to 
which the State of Utah is a party. That pro-
:vision states: 
The making of profit out of 
public monies, or using the 
same for any purpose not au-
thorized by law, by any pub-
lic officer, shall be deemed 
a felony, and shall be punished 
as provided by law, but part 
of such punishment shall be 
disqualification to hold pub-
lic off ice. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that members of the Utah State 
Legislature are 11 public officers. 11 Hansen v. 
ik9al Services Committee, 19 Utah 2d 229, 429 
P.2d 978 (1967) • Since the constitutional pro-
vision is applicable to "any public officer, 11 
the conclusion that legislators fall within its 
purview is inescapable. 
Once it is determined that legislators are 
~iliJect to the proscription, it becomes necessary 
4 
wdctermine the nature and the extent of its terms. 
At this point, the plaintiffs assert that article 
ixrn, section 8 of the Utah Constitution limits 
the activities only of those public officers whose 
specific and only duties are to maintain the cus-
1tody and control over public funds. They would 
l~enerally limit the application of the provision 
I 
Ito public treasurers. Indeed, it cannot be doubted 
that public treasurers fall within the ambit of the 
.prohibition. However, the defendants further con-
.tend that included are all public officers who ex-
ercise control over public funds. 
That control over given funds is necessary for 
~invocation of article XIII, section 8 has been 
~~nized by this Court. Raymond v. Larson, 11 
Utah 2d 371, 359 P.2d 1048 (1961). 
In the Raymond case, the conclusion was drawn 
5 
t\tat Uw constitutional provision with which we 
lie concerned was intended to apply to property 
or funds 11 controlled in a fiduciary capacity by 
public officials. 11 Thus, it becomes necessary to 
ascertain the nature of the position one holds as 
a member of a legislative body. 
It is universally recognized that, subject 
~certain constitutional limitations, a legisla-
ture has plenary power over state funds. E.g., 
Commonwealth v. Ferries Co., 92 S.E. 804 (Va. 1917). 
As was stated in Davis v. Moon, 77 Ida. 146, 289 
P.2d 614 (1955) : 
The legislature has absolute 
control over the finances of 
the state. The power of the 
legislature as to the creation 
of indebtedness, or the expend-
iture of state funds, or making 
appropriations, is plenary, ex-
cept only as limited by the state 
Constitution. 
6 
Having control over state funds as the Leg-
0l~ure does, it would seem that the requisites 
pronounced in the Raymond case exist. It is true 
thdt the control exercised by the Legislature gen-
erally is not direct control in that contracts and 
their attendant expenditures are normally adminis-
,tered by other state agencies. But once control 
,exists, and particularly where the control is ulti-
mate (with certain exceptions) , it is no less ob-
jectionable that it may be indirect control. 
The ~aymond case indicated that the above-
cited constitutional provision applies to public 
Officials who control public funds in a "fiduciary 
capacity." It is the contention of the defendants 
that members of a legislative body in which the 
1tneral public reposes its confidence and trust 
ai~i in a fiduciary capacity, and, therefore, may 
7 
be interested in contracts to which the State 
of Utah is a party. In Norbeck & Nicholson Co. v. 
s:ate, 142 N.W. 847 (S.D. 1913) it was noted that: -
A member of the state Legisla-
ture, by virtue of his office, 
stands in a fiduciary and trust 
relation towards the state; in 
other words, he is the confiden-
tial agent of the state for the 
purpose of appropriating the 
state's money in payment of the 
lawful contractual obligations 
of the state, and it seems to 
be almost universally held that 
it is against sound public policy 
to permit such an agent, or any 
agent occupying a like position, 
to himself be directly or indi-
rectly interested in any contract 
with the state • • • during the 
period of time of the existence 
of such trust and confidential 
relationship. 
If it is found that a contract involving the 
State of Utah is tainted by a conflict of interest, 
15 the infirmity removed because of the fact that 
t> 
·'it contract was negotiated by means of a sealed 
8 
hld7 In the absence of a specific statutory or 
co11stitutional except ion, a conflict of interest 
is not removed by the submission of sealed bids. 
ir:fil~ll v. City of Taft, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 375 
P.2d 289 ( 1962) , a conflict of interest was held 
~~in existence although the public officer 
~se position was being scrutinized had submitted 
I 
the lowest sealed bid. Similarly, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Raymond v. Larson, 11 Utah 2d 371, 359 
P.2d 1048 (1961) was confronted with a sealed bid 
situation. The Court found that a conflict of 
interest did not exist for the necessary power or 
control over the funds in question was nonexistent. 
It is apparent that, if a sealed bid removes the 
conflict, the Court need never have considered the 
Si1cstion of whether there was control over the funds· 
If it is determined, then, that a conflict of 
9 
nterest exists, it is clear that plaintiffs can-
~ be afforded relief on the basis that their 
nvolvement was according to sealed bid procedures. 
Assuming that article XIII, section 8 of the 
ltili Constitution does not prohibit contracts con-
1ummated within a framework of a conflict of in-
~est, defendants submit that constitutional and 
tatutory proscriptions against public officers 
1eing interested in contracts to which the govern-
~~al entities they serve are a party are but 
~larations of the common law, Shasta County v. 
~' 90 Cal.App. 519, 265 Pac. 1032 (1928), Utah 
kt'y Gen. Op. No. 58-048, May 29, 1958, and that 
~e common law principles are applicable in the 
~vent the conclusion is reached that article XIII, 
~tion 8 of the Utah Constitution does not prohibit 
conflicts of interest. 
10 
The common law prohibition extended to all 
~lk officers, and the defendants have found 
.othing indicating that legislators were accorded 
rre~rential treatment. Thus, assuming the inap-
1licabili ty of existing constitutional and statu-
mcy law, legislators should be precluded from 
leing interested in contracts to which the State 
1f Utah is a party. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT DICTATE A RELAXED IN-
~ERPRETATION OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES. 
The questions with which the Court is faced 
In this case, while not simple and not subject to 
~~ solution, are less complex and present fewer 
~tactical difficulties than the plaintiffs would 
have us believe. It has been argued that an appli-
~ation of the conflict of interest doctrine as 
11 
vterpreted by defendants will disqualify large 
~~nts of our society from possible participa-
ion in government as members of the Utah State 
~gislature. In fact, it appears that 26 of the 
Bmembers of the Utah State Senate have some 
nvolvement contractually with the State of Utah. 
bis, of course, is no excuse. It is an indict-
~t. A proliferation of the evil does not lessen 
he gravity of the offense. If it is found that 
any would have a conflict of interest if they 
cted in the capacity of legislators, the many 
~uld be disqualified from so acting. 
Apparently, the plaintiffs are arguing that, 
6 a matter of policy, the State of Utah cannot 
~ord to draw legislative talent from a restricted 
klurce. The defendants submit that the State of 
~ah, as a matter of sound public policy, must 
12 
ecessarily limit possible membership in the Leg-
slaturc. And upon cursory reflection, it is 
vident that an unwarranted disqualification of 
unique" legislative talent will not be the result. 
f the private, pecuniary and conflicting interest 
fa potential member of the Legislature is rela-
ively small, he need merely di vest himself of his 
nterest and avoid the disqualification. If, on 
~~her hand, the private interest is substan-
ial, a potential legislator will refuse to divest 
imself of his interest and he will consequently 
e disqualified. 
That citizens with conflicting and substan-
~l pecuniary interests might be precluded from 
~ving as legislators does not strike the defend-
hls as a result to be condemned. It should be 
PPlFJuded. 
13 
Finally, plaintiffs have offered their lack 
f inlent to defraud as a factor to be considered. 
he defendants have never intimated that the con-
oct of any legislator has been actually motivated 
yprospects of personal gain. The service rendered 
othe public by the plaintiff-legislator has been 
[the highest caliber and he is to be commended 
or such service. However, actual self-dealing 
as never been a prerequisite to an application of 
onflict of interest principles. Such principles 
re designed to remove the temptation to sacrifice 
he interests of the public for anticipated private 
lain, and an absence of self-dealing makes the con-
lict of interest doctrine no less viable. E.g., 
~a_y. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 57 Pac. 777 (1899). 
CONCLUSION 
Members of the Utah State Legislature are 
14 
rohibited from being interested, either directly 
cindirectly, in contracts to which the State of 
tah is a party. The prohibition is derived from 
~Utah Constitution and from the common law. 
ublic policy does not dictate a relaxation of 
~nflict of interest principles, for the pool from 
hich "unique legislative talent" may be drawn will 
otbe unduly limited. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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